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EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND EVIDENCE IN RITA V. UNITED
STATES
PAUL J. HOFERt
INTRODUCTION

"Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts" according to a popular saying, variously attributed to Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, James Schlessinger, or some unknown author. The line of
cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey' and continuing most recently xWith Rita v. United States2 certainly confirms the first part of the
quote. The various majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
these cases express a wide range of theories regarding the roles of juries
and judges in fact-finding and the constitutional requirements for facts
used at sentencing. Perhaps the most extreme example of a split opinion,
one can hope, was the Court's bifurcated ruling in United States v.
Booker.3 Booker's remedial opinion, which made the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines") "advisory" rather than "mandatory, 4 seems
strangely irrelevant to the constitutional values underlying the merits
opinion, which concerned the importance of the jury right in finding facts
that increase punishment. District and appellate courts are now engaged
in defining what "advisory" Guidelines mean, and what procedural and
substantive requirements still attend sentencing in the federal courts.
While opinions vary, facts have an independence and objectivity
that the right empirical methods promise to reveal. Of course, consensus
on the facts and what conclusions can safely be drawn from them is still
often elusive, particularly when the facts at issue require statistical analysis and interpretation. Contrary to another popular saying, statistics are
neither lies nor damn lies, but they can be used improperly and they can
be too limited to reach certain conclusions. Fortunately for social and
behavioral scientists working in law and public policy, statistics can often provide sound answers to important empirical questions that would
otherwise be left to anecdote or opinion.
t Paul J. Hofer, B.A., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1980; J.D., University of Maryland
School of Law, 1986; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1987. This work was undertaken while the
author was Senior Research Associate at the United States Sentencing Commission. He currently
conducts independent research and teaches at Johns Hopkins University. The views expressed in
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect any policies or positions of the
United States Sentencing Commission.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2.
127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007).
3.
543 U.S. 220, 229 (2005).
4.
Id.at 245.
5.
Id.at 243-45.
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Statistical data have been presented to the Supreme Court since the
introduction of the famous "Brandeis Brief' in 1908.6 In Rita, the respondent Department of Justice and three amici curiae-the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), the Federal Public and Community Defenders with the National Association of Federal Defenders (FPCD), and
the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (NYCDL)-continued this
Legal Realist tradition by providing the Court with data on an empirical
question relevant to the case: Does an appellate presumption of reasonableness for sentences within the guideline range have an effect on the7
outcomes of appeals or on sentences imposed by the district courts?
Although the Court reached no conclusion on the question and suggested
that its decision did not depend on any particular answer, the question is
interesting in its own right. Knowing the effects of a presumption of reasonableness could help predict the consequences of the Supreme Court's
decision to permit the courts of appeals to adopt such a presumption.
While not the subject of original data presented to the Court, the
briefs in Rita also reviewed research relevant to other empirical issues.
Most important among these were the questions of the Guidelines' effect
on unwarranted disparity and whether the Guidelines have successfully
helped to achieve the statutory purposes of sentencing. In addition, the
decision itself makes a series of empirical claims and raises important
research questions for the future. This article briefly reviews these other
empirical questions after taking a closer look at the data presented to the
Court on the effects of an appellate presumption of reasonableness.
I. THE NON-EFFECT OF THE FACTS ON THE LAW

United States v. Booker held that to avoid impinging the Sixth8
Amendment jury right, the Guidelines must be advisory, not mandatory.
This would appear to grant sentencing judges greater discretion, compared to before the decision, to sentence within or outside the guideline
range. Booker also established a "reasonableness" standard of appellate
review for sentencing decisions, which is emerging as largely equivalent
to review for abuse of discretion and different from the de novo review
that had been established by the PROTECT Act of 2003. 9 Prior to the
6. Muller v. Georgia, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Justice Brandeis, who was then acting as a
litigator, provided the Court with data on the health effects of long working hours on women. See
Brief for Respondent, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605.
7. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Brief for Petitioner at *28, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3740371; Brief for the United States at *34-39, Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 186288; Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *15-16, Rita v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 173622; Brief for the Federal Public and Community
Defenders & the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *12-15, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3760844; Brief
for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *5-9, Rita
v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3742254).
8.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
9. Id. at 261.
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PROTECT Act, appellate courts had applied the abuse of discretion
standard pursuant to the 1996 Supreme Court case Koon v. United
States. 0
Just how much discretion Booker actually returned to sentencing
judges will depend on the substance and rigor of these new standards,
and how they differ from those previously in effect." It is natural to
expect that the legal changes granting judges greater discretion would
have an effect on actual judicial behavior, as Booker indeed did. 12 Conversely, one might expect that data concerning actual judicial behavior
might have an effect on the Court as it gives definition to the new regime.
The petitioner in Rita and several of his amici assumed that appellate review that tended to encourage sentences within the guideline range
would have the effect of decreasing the "advisory" quality of the Guidelines, potentially raising the same constitutional problems that had
plagued the former "mandatory" Guidelines.13 Standards of review and
review procedures that increased the likelihood that courts of appeals
would affirm within-range sentences would consequently increase the
likelihood that sentencing judges would sentence within the guideline
range.' 4 Because that range will often have been increased by facts
found by the judge, and not the jury, review that tended to increase sentences within the guideline range could raise Sixth Amendment problems.15 One could thus assume that data showing that the presumption
had the effect of increasing within-range sentences, and affirmance of
those sentences on appeal, could be relevant to the constitutional analysis.
10.
518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
11.
In Booker, the Court excised the previous statutory standard for departures outside the
guideline range, which required judges to identify an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the USSC in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described [by the guidelines]." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(b)(1) (2007). This standard remains, however, in the USSC's policy statement in the U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2006), which sets out grounds for departure. After
Booker, a new type of outside-the-range sentence has been recognized-a "variance"-which is not
bound by this standard but only by the statutory provisions found at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) and
whatever substantive standards emerge from reasonableness review.
See generally Paul J. Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment, 6
12.
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 433 (2007).
13.
Several commentators, including this author, have questioned the substance and accuracy
of these labels. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L.
REv 155, 156 (2005) (describing the terms as "legal jargon" and "distorted terminology" holding
"talismanic power" for some justices, but having little inherent legal effect); see also Paul J. Hofer,
Immediate andLong-Term Effects of United States v. Booker: More Discretion, More Disparity, or
Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425, 437-38 (2006) (arguing that the Guidelines met
the usual definition for "presumptive" guidelines prior to Booker and remain "presumptive" after,
with the major difference being the standard for departure or "variance," which will emerge only as
reasonableness review is given substance).
14.
Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007) (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note
15.

Id.
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It turns out that, as a legal matter, this assumption was wrong. Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Rita makes clear that "the presumption,
even if it increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find
'sentencing facts,' does not violate the Sixth Amendment." ' 16 The constitutional question "is only whether the law forbids a judge to increase a
defendant's sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find
(and the offender did not concede)."' 7 The presumption does not require
a within-guideline sentence, nor does it "forbid the sentencing judge
from imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the
jury-determined facts standing alone.' 18 The Guidelines are still legally
advisory, even if the presumption increases the frequency that they are
followed, perhaps even to rates similar to those found in some periods
under the previous "mandatory" system.' 9 "As far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard the Guidelines" and apply a longer
sentence.2 0
Justice Scalia and other dissenters have not been impressed with
these legalistic niceties since they were first introduced in Booker, and
they remained unimpressed in Rita.2' When engaging in reasonableness
review, they argue, the question is under what circumstances it is permissible to sentence outside the guideline range. Justice Alito argued in
Cunningham v. California,22 an earlier 2007 case involving the California sentencing guidelines, that if reasonableness is to have any substance,
there must be some circumstances in which it would be unreasonable to
sentence above the guideline range without finding facts in addition to
those found by the jury or conceded by the defendant.23 Those facts
would then raise the constitutional problem identified in the Booker merits opinion. Justice Scalia in Rita argued in dissent that, even though
such circumstances were not present in the instant case, any reasonableness review with substance will necessarily raise lingering Sixth
Amendment issues and thus should not prevail.24 He proposed a purely
procedural form of review to avoid such problems.25
Justice Souter, in dissent, showed the greatest concern with what a
presumption of reasonableness means for actual judicial behavior, and
whether it "would tend to produce guidelines sentences almost as regularly as the mandatory Guidelines had done., 26 He ultimately could not
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 2466.

18.
19.

Id.
See id. at 2467.

20.
21.

Id. at 2466 (emphasis added).
See id. at 2474-77 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 2487-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).

22.

127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).

23.
24.

Id. at 880 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

25.

Id.at 2476, 2483.

26.

Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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endorse the presumption because it would contribute "gravitational pull"
to the Guidelines and move the system back toward being mandatory."
Justice Stevens, in concurrence with the majority, accepted the presumption because he found it consistent with review for abuse of discretion. 8 He shared Justice Souter's view that the guidelines should not be
treated as mandatory now as they were before Booker. He doubted,
however, Justice Souter's empirical prediction that the presumption
would affect judicial behavior by exerting "gravitational pull. '29 To help
weaken any possible pull, Justice Stevens emphasized the deference
owed to all individualized sentencing decisions, whether inside the
guideline range or outside it. 30 He particularly encouraged sentencing
judges to consider individual characteristics that the USSC has deemed
"not ordinarily relevant," wryly re-christening them "not ordinarily considered" under the Guidelines. 3 '
These concerns about gravitational effects notwithstanding, data
about the effect of the presumption on actual judicial behavior ultimately
had no impact on the decision. Justice Breyer and the majority concluded that, even if the petitioner and the amici were correct that the pre"we do
sumption encourages judges to sentence within the Guidelines,
" ' 32
calculus.
constitutional
the
change
could
fact
that
how
not see
II. THE NON-EFFECT OF THE LAW ON THE FACTS
Legally, it didn't matter whether the presumption actually affects
judicial behavior. But factually, who was correct? Does an appellate
presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline sentences affect affirmance and reversal rates by the appellate courts, or use of the guideline range by sentencing judges? This empirical question was addressed
in the briefs and the amount of data concerning it that was presented to
the court was daunting. Moreover, the various parties made conflicting
claims about what the data showed. Both because the question itself is
interesting, and because it serves as an example of the difficulties involved in drawing sound conclusions from statistics, close examination
of the data in the briefs is worthwhile.
A. Appellate Decision Making
Petitioner-Defendant Victor Rita and his amici pointed to some
striking facts. Data gathered by the NYCDL showed that, of 1,152 ap-

27.
28.
29.

Id.
concurring).
Id.at 2471 (Stevens, J.,
Id. at 2473-74.

30.

Id.

31.
32.

Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2467 (majority opinion).
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peals of within-guideline sentences in the post-Booker period,33 only
sixteen had been vacated by appeals courts and only one of these was
because the sentence was found substantively unreasonable.34 Fifteen
were vacated for procedural unreasonableness, usually because the sentencing court did not adequately explain its reasons.35 Rita argued that
the circuits seemed to be treating within-guideline sentences as per se
reasonable, which would encourage sentencing judges to seek the safe
36
haven of the Guidelines and discourage sentences outside the range.
Citing Sentencing Commission-sponsored reports, the NYCDL argued
that sentences recommended by the Guidelines "are often greater than
necessary" to achieve the § 3553(a) statutory purposes.3 7 Suspicion
should be raised, it argued, by a "pattern in which less than .08% of appealed within-guideline
sentences are reversed as substantively unrea38
sonable.
1. Unusual Circumstances of
the Sole Within-range Reversal39
United States v. Lazenby
The question of whether a presumption of reasonableness contributes to the high affirmance rate of within-guideline sentences was complicated, however, by the fact that the only circuit which has reversed a
within-guideline sentence on substantive grounds4° -the Eighth-had
41
itself adopted a presumption of reasonableness several months earlier.
The unusual circumstances of this unique case, United States v. Lazenby,
merit study to explore what has been needed to rebut the presumption.
Two female co-defendants had been involved in a methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution conspiracy for which they purchased precursor chemicals.4 2 Both had a romantic relationship with the
same, more culpable co-defendant, who was already serving a lengthy
prison term.4 3 They were sentenced one month apart by different
judges. 44 One received a within-guideline sentence of 87 months;45 the
33.
Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at *3.The NYCDL data were obtained through a keyword search of Westlaw.
The FPCD used a slightly different search. Each search returned a different number of cases, which
accounts for the differences in numbers in each category. Although no bias is obvious in any of the
search procedures, it is difficult to determine which returned the most representative and complete
results.

34. Id.at *5.
35.
Id.
36. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *34.
37. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at *5.
38.
Id.
39. 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006).
40. id.at 933-34.
41.
United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005)
42.
Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 929-30.
43.
Id.
44. Id.at 931.
45. Id.
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other a sentence of twelve months and one day,46 substantially below the
applicable guideline range of 70-87 months.47 The Eighth Circuit stated
that "[t]he notable aspect of these appeals is the extreme disparity in the
sentences imposed on two remarkably similar participants in the same
criminal conspiracy. Moreover, a number of factors suggest that 'sub8
stantially greater leniency was afforded the more culpable defendant.
The circuit reversed the below-range sentence as unreasonable, noting its prior ruling that "an extraordinary reduction must be supported by
extraordinary circumstances," which it found lacking in this case. 49 The
within-range sentence posed a more difficult question, since it was presumed reasonable and only "highly unusual circumstances will cause this
court to conclude that the presumption has been rebutted." 50 The court
found that the case was highly unusual based on several facts.51
First, even the prosecutor had stated at the sentencing hearing that
the defendants were similar. 52 The difference in their guideline ranges
was the result of different quantities of drugs stipulated in their plea
agreements; according to the pre-sentence report, these different quanti53
ties did not reflect meaningful differences in their offense conduct.
The defendant receiving the guideline sentence was the first of the
co-defendants to plead guilty, and she agreed to cooperate with the government.54 However, her testimony was not needed and no motion for a
sentence reduction based on substantial assistance was made by the
prosecutor, even though the circuit inferred that her cooperation played a
role in the guilty pleas of others.5 5 The circuit believed the sentencing
judge had given "too much weight" to the prosecutor's statement that she
was not authorized to seek a below-range sentence.56 Most important,
the circuit found that too little weight had been given to the "extreme
disparity between the sentences imposed on two similarly situated con-

46.

Id. at 930.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.at 932.

49.
Id. (quoting United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005)). The reasonableness of this standard is itself the subject of a pending appeal before the Supreme Court. See
United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June
11, 2007) (No. 06-7949).
50.
Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 933.
51.
Id.

52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.

55.

Id.;see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11,§ 5KI.I (allowing

for a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based on a defendant's "substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense .....
56.

Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 934.
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spirators." 57 It thus reversed both the below-range and the within-range
sentences and remanded for re-sentencing.5
This case shows that it is possible for within-range sentences to
overcome the presumption of reasonableness and be reversed. But the
highly unusual circumstances, with the two defendants treated in the
same appeal, is likely to give little solace to defendants. And a single
example cannot answer whether the presumption makes affirmance of
within-guideline sentences more likely than they would be without a presumption. To answer this we need statistical comparisons of large numbers of cases.
2. Comparisons of Circuits With and Without the Presumption
The natural comparisons needed to assess the causal effects of a
presumption of reasonableness are: (1) between circuits that do and do
not have the presumption; and (2) within circuits before and after adopting the presumption. "Causal effects" is social and behavioral science
lingo, and to some it may seem more appropriate for describing billiard
balls hitting than the legal consequences of a court decision. Philosophers sometimes distinguish human reasons from physical causes, and
object to analyzing human decision making in mechanistic terms. Moreover, some arguments raised by the parties and amici did not necessarily
imply that the presumption causedjudicial behavior, but instead cast the
presumption more as a symptom of "institutional resistance" to Booker59
or of a "culture of guideline compliance." 60 Nevertheless, an important
underlying empirical claim in Rita's argument was that judicial behavior
would be affected by the presumption, and this implies some type of
causation. Thus, any change in behavior caused by adoption of the presumption should be reflected in affirmance and reversal rates.
Clean comparisons to test this hypothesis were hard to find, however. Because all but sixteen within-range sentences had been affirmed,6 1 these numbers were too small for meaningful comparisons
across circuits or time. Analysts had to rely on affirmance and reversal
rates for outside-the-range sentences. 62 But for these, a factor more important than whether a presumption was applied is whether the sentence
was above or below the guideline range. Potentially complicating matters even further, the identity of the party filing the appeal might also
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supranote 7, at * 1.
60. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *29 (quoting Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker:
Advisory Guidelines in the FederalSystem, 43 HoUS. L. REV. 341,349 (2006)).

61.
See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 7, at *5.
62. See id.at *5-6 (reviewing statistical analysis of affirmance and reversal rates for sentences
outside the Sentencing Guidelines).
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have an effect. Some below-range sentences are appealed by the defense, although none of these proved successful at achieving a reversal.6 3
Despite these difficulties, the NYCDL argued that "formal adoption
of a presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences
seems to affect the review of even those sentences not within the guidelines." 64 Its data showed that in circuits that had adopted the presumption, 47 of 51 below-range sentences appealed by the government were
vacated as unreasonable, a reversal rate of 92 percent.65 In circuits not
adopting the presumption, 13 of 20 were vacated, a reversal rate of 65
percent.66 The FPCD data were slightly different, but with the same
overall pattern: 86.2 percent reversal in government-appealed belowrange sentences in presumption circuits and 60 percent in nonpresumption circuits. 67
Lost in these comparisons, however, is whether the differences between these circuits were any less prior to adoption of the presumption
by some of them. Without these comparisons, the data do not reveal
whether the presumption itself was a contributing cause of the higher
reversal rate of below-range sentences or whether the differences preexisted adoption of the presumption, as was argued by the Department of
Justice.
3. Comparisons of Reversal Rates for Above- and Below-Range
Sentences
Rita also argued that, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Booker, the courts of appeals were not applying the same reasonableness
standard of review "across the board. 6 8 This was particularly so regarding sentences above the guideline range appealed by the defense compared to below the guideline range appealed by the government. The
NYCDL framed these data in a larger argument that courts were not
complying with the first statutory command at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
which directs courts to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary" to comply with the statutory purposes. 69 The sentencing literature calls this the "parsimony provision," and the NYCDL argued that

63. Id. at *6 n.6 (noting that 138 below-range sentences were appealed by defendants asking
for a greater reduction).
64. Id. at *6.
65. Id. app. at 5a.
66. Id. app. at 6a.
67. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Anicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at * 13.
68. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2488 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223 (2005)).
69. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 7, at *4.
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"empirical data revealed70 non-parsimonious patterns in the application of

reasonableness review.,

The NYCDL data showed that 78.3 percent of below-range sentences appealed by the government were reversed, compared to 3.5 percent of above-range sentences appealed by the defense. The FPCD reported the same rates, and reviewed case law to argue that below-range
to de novo, while review of above-range
sentences receive review akin
7
sentences is "perfunctory.", 1
The problem with the statistical comparisons is that not all outsidethe-range sentences are equally likely to be appealed, and the merits of
these appeals may not be equal. Different incentives bear on defense and
prosecuting attorneys and their selection criteria for appeals are very
different. Even though there are about seven and a half times more nongovernment sponsored below-range sentences than above-range sentences, Rita's data showed that government appeals of below-range sentences are far less frequent-just slightly more than half- than defendant
appeals of above-range sentences. 72 In other words, a much smaller portion of below-range sentences are appealed by the government, and they
are likely selected for merit as well as for policy considerations.7 3
The difficulty of making clean inferences from appellate affirmance
and reversal rates led the USSC to exclude any comparisons of these data
from its amicus brief.74 It simply wasn't clear that the data addressed the

empirical issue before the Court. The same was not true, however, of
rates of within and outside-the-range sentences imposed by district
judges.
B. District Court Decision Making
Petitioner Rita cited rates of within-, above-, and below-guideline
sentences to argue that "[a] culture of guideline compliance has persisted
after Booker."75 Data on these rates are released quarterly by the USSC
and have provided the key measure of Booker's effects on sentencing.76
Because of the large numbers of cases involved and the long time frame
70.
71.

Id.at *5-9.
Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of

Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at * 13, * 16-19.
72.
See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note *7, app. 5a-6a.
73.
A more telling comparison would be the likelihood of reversal of all above and belowrange sentences. However, data to make this comparison is not available in either the data gathered
by the Rita amici or in the regular releases of the USSC.
74.
See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Suppporting
Respondent, supra note *7.
75.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *29, (citing Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note
60, at 349).
76.
Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at *18 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 38 (Dec. 2006)).
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for which data are available, these rates can be used to assess the causal
effects of court decisions, 77 legislation, 78 and other historical factors.
And they can be used to test the effects, if any, of the adoption of a presumption of reasonableness. Again, comparisons are needed across circuits that have or have not adopted the presumption and within a circuit
before and after adoption of the presumption. The amici briefs of the
FPCD and the USSC set out to directly test the effects of the presumption on sentencing judges by making these comparisons. Both briefs
used USSC data, yet they drew very different conclusions.
1. Same Facts, Different Conclusions
The USSC brief first restated the petitioner's hypothesis-that a
presumption of reasonableness renders the Guidelines effectively mandatory-but concluded that "the Commission's data refute that argument." 79 Indeed, the USSC noted, "[i]f petitioners' theory were correct,
one would expect to see over time a significant and widening gap between the rate of below-guideline sentences in circuits with a presumption of reasonableness and the rate of such sentences in circuits without a
presumption. 80 The brief then switched to a comparison of withinsystem8 l sentences, which are inversely related to below-range sentences,
stating: "On the contrary, the rate at which sentencing judges impose a
sentence [within the system] in circuits that apply the presumption is
quite close to the rate in circuits that apply no presumption 82....And the
difference in those rates has remained virtually unchanged.
The FPCD brief concluded the opposite:

77.

Hofer, supra note 12. See generally Paul J. Hofer ET AL., Departure Rates and Reasons

After Koon v. United States, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 284 (1997).
78.
Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing Practices? The
Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Freeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005)

(exploring the empirical assumptions of the Freeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21 (codified at 117 Stat.
650 (2003))).

79.

Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-

spondent, supra note 7, at * 16.

80.
81.
guideline
formance

Id.
In post-Booker data releases and testimony, the USSC has described sentences within the
range combined with government-sponsored sentences below the guideline range as "conwith the guidelines." See Oversight Hearingon United States v. Booker: One Year Later

- Chaos or Status Quo? Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.

Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair,
United States Sentencing Commission). The government sponsors below-range sentences for offenders who substantially assist in the prosecution of other persons, or participate in a fast-track
program by pleading guilty quickly, or otherwise reach a plea agreement for a below-range sentence.
82. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at * 16. The Department of Justice also argued that differences among the
presumption and non-presumption circuits predate Booker. See Brief for the United States, supra

note 7, at *38. Limitations in the Commission's ability to distinguish government-sponsored from
other below range sentences make comparisons of rates prior to 2003 problematic, however.

38
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The gap between the rate of below-guideline sentences imposed by
district courts in circuits that have returned the Guidelines to their
presumptive status and that in circuits that have declined to do so has
steadily widened. As of November 27, 2006, the rate 83in nonpresumption circuits exceeded that in presumption by 34.2%.
Both the USSC and the FPCD included graphs in appendices to their
briefs. Figure 1 reproduces the FPCD graph displaying a widening in
below-range rates between presumption and non-presumption circuits.
Figure 2 shows the USSC's graph, with below-range rates in presumption and non-presumption circuits at the bottom and within-range rates at
the top. No widening gap is apparent in either set of lines. It is embarrassing for social science when different empirical conclusions are drawn
from the same data, and it is worth trying to figure out why. As usual
with statistical evidence, the devil is in the details.
Figure 1: Data from FPCD Brief
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83.
Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at *12.
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Figure 2: Data from USSC Brief
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2. Different Methods Lead to Different Conclusions
The differences between the two graphs, and in the conclusions
drawn from them, can be explained largely by differences in the methods
used to create them.84 The FPCD was burdened with several serious data
limitations that the USSC could avoid since the USSC collects the data
and has complete access. First, since the USSC's publicly-released data
is quarterly and not monthly, the FPCD could not provide monthly data
that could more precisely pinpoint possible effects. Second, the USSC's
quarterly data releases are cumulative, i.e., they do not break out the rates
in mutually exclusive time periods. Thus, there is overlap in the periods
on the FPCD graph that makes clean comparisons impossible.
Another methodological difference concerned how to classify circuits. Some circuits had a decision adopting the presumption of reasonableness, others had a decision explicitly declining to adopt such a presumption, and others (and all at the beginning) had no decision either
way. As reported in the footnote to its graph, the FPCD compared circuits that had adopted a presumption, represented by the lower line in the
graph, with all others. 85 As reported in the Methodology section of the
Appendix, the USSC compared circuits that had adopted the presumption
with circuits that had held that sentences within the guideline range are
84.

One difference concerned the law.

The FPCD found that the Fifth Circuit became a

presumptive circuit in the case United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005). The USSC did
not classify that circuit as presumptive until several months later in United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d
551 (5th Cir. 2006).
Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
85.
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at app. 1.
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not presumed reasonable.86 Circuits that had reached no conclusion were
excluded from the graph. 8 7 It is not immediately obvious which comparison is superior. One might expect any effect of the presumption to
be strongest in a comparison among circuits that had explicitly chosen
one way or the other. Yet the Sentencing Commission's data, which
made that comparison, showed no effect.
Another methodological issue makes drawing conclusions from the
FPCD analysis difficult. The various circuits have markedly different
below-range rates, and have had these rates for a long time. These differences predate the adoption of the presumption and reflect a myriad of
institutional, cultural, political, and other factors. The USSC graph
divides circuits according to whether they explicitly adopted or declined
to adopt the presumption at any time. The rates for these circuits are
then compared across the entire period. The same circuits are compared
in each month. The FPCD graph divides the circuits based on whether
they had adopted the presumption by that particulartime. Thus different
circuits are compared at different times on the graph.
Whenever a circuit is added to the mix, it adds to the overall rate
both any influence of the presumption and also all the other influences
that make some circuits have higher rates than others. An extreme example helps make this clear. If the most "conservative" circuits have the
lowest below-range rates and are also the most eager to declare withinguideline sentences presumptively reasonable, the rates earliest on the
line representing presumptive circuits would be suppressed by those circuits' overall conservatism. If less conservative circuits adopt the presumption later, the overall rate could well go up, even if the presumption
does cause rates to be suppressed to some extent. If one accepts this
example as plausible, the method used by the FPCD actually stacked the
deck against supporting its claim. But in fact, the data do not fit this
extreme example. It is difficult, however, to decipher from the FPCD
chart how the timing of the circuit decisions may have influenced the
rates, and whether the presumption itself had an independent effect. In
short, and in social science lingo, the effects of other differences among
the circuits are confounded with any possible effects of the presumption.
3. Examining Individual Circuits
One way to avoid this problem is to look at each circuit individually. The USSC brief included separate graphs for each circuit, showing
their monthly within-system and below-range rates along with a horizontal line indicating the month the circuit adopted the presumption or de-

86. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at app. 14a.
87. Id. at app. 14 (including data from all circuits except for the Federal Circuit).
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clined to adopt the presumption.88 Two of these graphs are included
here: the Fourth Circuit (Figure 3), from which Rita was appealed and
consistent among the circuits as having the lowest below-range rate; and
the Second Circuit (Figure 4), which has the highest below-range-rate.
Examination of these graphs and those for the other circuits included in
the brief89 demonstrates that it remains difficult to draw clear conclusions
regarding the effects of a presumption.

Figure 3: Fourth Circuit
FEDERAL WITHIN RANGE/GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SENTENCES
AND BELOW RANGE SENTENCES BY CIRCUIT
(February 1, 2005, through September 30, 2006)
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88. Id. at app. 1-13.
89. The full set of graphs for each circuit, along with the rest of the USSC's brief, can be
found at http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/USSC / 20Amicus / 2OBriefNos6-561806-5754.pdf.
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Figure 4: Second Circuit
FEEERAL WITHIN GUIDELINE RANGE/GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SENTENCES
AND BELOW RANGE SENTENCES BY CIRCUIT
(February 1, 2005, through September 30, 2006)
2nd Circuit (No Presumption of Reasonableness)
I00

WithiolisdgO..

a

. . . . . . . . ..

ore

60

June 21l, 2006

40

--

20

- -~

-

-

-

Below Ran ge
-~~

~~

-~-a~a
- -a
A& W--

i

0

U.S.
SOURMC

-0,g

2m..
O00

-8-.. O 0.1
sly C..d
USSCFYO.

N bsn.. D- 0.. USSC"NO.

In the Fourth Circuit, the rate declines after the presumption was
adopted. 90 In the Second Circuit, it appears lower after the presumption
was rejected.9 1 In the Third Circuit, not shown here, there is a similar
counter-hypothesis trend. 92 In others there is no obvious effect at all, or
the post-presumption rate appears to continue a pre-existing downward
trend, or the data are too few or too volatile to draw any conclusions.
The most precise thing one can say is that there is no obvious effect.
4. The Advantages of a More Rigorous Statistical Test
So-called "graphical analysis"-just looking at the graphs to see if
anything jumps out at you--can sometimes work to draw sound causal
conclusions.9 3 This is especially true if the effect one is looking for is
very strong and thus obvious. Where the effect is weak and different
circuits show different tendencies, any overall effect of the presumption
can easily be missed. It would be a more powerful test of the hypothesis
if data from all the circuits could somehow be examined at once.

See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
90.
Respondent, supra note 7, at app. 5.
91.
Id. at app. 3.
92.
Id. at app. 4.
93.
See Hofer, supra note 12.
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The statistical method multivariate regression can disentangle any
effect of the presumption from other pre-existing differences between the
circuits and also from any unknown influences that may have affected
rates in all circuits month-to-month. It also compares all the circuits at
once, and tests whether any difference between presumption and nonpresumption circuits is sufficiently great to rule out chance as a possible
explanation. Unfortunately, from a scientific perspective, no party or
amici used this method in their submissions to the Court. From a legal
and practical perspective, this may be understandable because most lawyers and judges are unfamiliar with the method and uncomfortable relying on its results. A knowledge gap exists between the statistical skills of
most lawyers and judges and the skills needed to apply and understand
the best methods for answering empirical questions embedded in the
94
law.

A multivariate analysis was not presented to the Supreme Court,
and the justices were left with competing claims and less-than-ideal data
and methods to resolve them. Perhaps it is best that the majority decided, as discussed in Part I, that the actual effects on judicial behavior of
adoption of the presumption were of no constitutional significance.
Hopefully, the conflicting and complicated statistical findings on this
empirical issue did not themselves influence the Justices to reject the
significance of the question. Legal Realists, who pioneered empiricism
and the Brandeis Brief, have always believed that legal decisions are best
made in light of the facts.
5. The Effect and Non-Effect of Legal Doctrine on Sentencing Behavior
Some lawyers are reluctant to believe that Supreme Court decisions
on apparently important legal questions sometimes do not make any difference in practice. Such was the case with an earlier Supreme Court
decision that set a nationwide standard for review of sentences outside
the guideline range, Koon v. United States.95 Koon established the
"abuse-of-discretion" standard for appellate review of guideline departures. 96 Attorneys in the Department of Justice subsequently blamed
Koon for an increase in downward departures and argued that reestablishment of a de novo standard-which was accomplished in the
PROTECT Act but undone by Booker-was needed to bring the nongovernment sponsored below-range rate back down.97 In fact, although
94.
For an early and comprehensive exploration of this issue, see generally John Monahan &
Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating,and Establishing Social Science in Law,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
95.
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
96. Id. at 99-100.
97. Child Pornography& Abduction Prevention, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 17-18 (2003) (statement of
Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Att'y General). See generally William W. Mercer, Assessing
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the downward departure rate did increase after Koon, the data show that
the increase was the continuation of a long-term trend that predated Koon
and was likely based on a variety of factors and little influenced by Koon
itself.98
Looking at the history of below-range rates under the Guidelines, it
is apparent that sometimes legislation and court decisions have affected
below-range rates and sometimes they have not. 99
There was a long-term and gradual increase in below-range sentences for the first dozen years after implementation of the Guidelines.' 00
Then, remarkably, the trend was reversed around 2001.101 This reversal
took place before enactment of the PROTECT Act, the sentencing sections of which were specifically designed to decrease non-government
sponsored below-range sentences. The PROTECT Act doubtless contributed to the downward trend in below-range sentences that continued
until the decision in Booker, but it was itself a reflection of an institutional shift at the Department of Justice that occurred with the change in
presidential administrations. For better or worse, the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorneys around the country set out to enforce the guideline range more
vigorously, and these efforts were reflected in the sen02
1
data.
tencing
Unlike Koon, Booker had an immediate and dramatic effect on sentences. The rate of both non-government sponsored below-range sentences and above-range sentences approximately doubled compared to
the PROTECT Act era, restoring the below-range rate to a level similar
to earlier in the guideline era.' 0 3 In the most recent quarters, the rate has
held steady been twelve percent. 1°4 The
rate of above-range sentences in
05
the most recent quarters is 1.5 percent.1

Compliance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Significance of Improved Data Collection and
Reporting, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 43 (2003) (observing that non-substantial assistance downward
departures increased significantly after Koon).
98.
Mark T. Bailey, Note, Feeney's Folly: Why Appellate Courts Should Review Departures
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference, 90 IOWA L. REV. 269, 295-300 (2004)
(noting that the government rarely appealed downward departures after Koon but was highly successful when it did, and arguing that Koon had little effect on departure rates); Paul J. Hofer ET AL.,
supranote 77, at 284-86, 290.
99.
See Hofer, supra note 13 at 427-29, 431-34 (for a graph and further discussion of longterm trends).
100.
Id. at 428-29 (including Figure 1: Monthly Rates of In-Range and Out-of-Range Sentences).
101.
Id.
102.
For a discussion of the Department of Justice's institutional relationship with the Sentencing Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The PoliticalScience of FederalSentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2005).

103.

Hofer, supra note 13, at 433.

104.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (2ND
QUARTER RELEASE PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2007 DATA THROUGH MARCH 31, 2007) 1 (tbl. 1)

(2007), http://www.ussc.gov/sc cases/Quarter Report 2Qrt_07.pdf (last visited September 15,
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While Booker increased the rate of below-range sentences based on
mitigating factors identified by the sentencing judge, the most common
reasons for sentencing outside the guideline range have always been government-sponsored. In the early years of the Guidelines, this was due to
a government motion for a sentence reduction to reward an offender's
substantial assistance in the prosecution of other persons,10 6 or for other
reasons included as part of a plea agreement with the defendant. The
PROTECT Act added a new reason-the defendant's participation in an
"early disposition program," which rewards an offender for pleading
guilty quickly and foregoing other procedural rights. 0 7 In the most recent quarter, 25.1 percent of offenders received a below-range sentence
for one of these government-sponsored reasons.10 8 Clearly, the most
important influences on within-range rates are not the legal standards
governing appellate review of judge-initiated departures, but the policies
and programs of the Department of Justice.
6. The Likely (Non-) Effect of Rita
Is the effect of Rita likely to be substantial like Booker or weak like
Koon? The best guess is weak. In part, this is supported by the absence
of an obvious effect of the presumption in the circuits. In part, it is because of the weakness of the decision itself. The court majority appeared
determined to underscore the unimportance of the presumption, describing it as "non-binding" and contrasting it with evidentiary presumptions
that shoulder one party with a burden of persuasion or proof. Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion also makes clear that he endorses the presumption because it is consistent with the deference owed to the decisions of sentencing judges. He emphasizes, however, that similar deference is owed to their decisions to sentence outside the guideline range,
raising a question of what exactly the presumption means for substantive
review.
The decision in Rita seems weak and somewhat strange in another
way: While the petition for certiorari was granted in the face of a conflict
in the circuits, the decision doesn't appear to resolve the conflict. The
decision states that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness.' 0 9 But the courts do not appear required to do so. One
commentator has noted that this lack of resolution of the circuit conflict
2007). The Commission releases new quarterly figures on its website, www.ussc.gov, as soon as
they become available.
105.
Id.
106.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 5KI.1; see also Stephanos
Bibas, Criminal Law: The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of ProsecutorialPower to
Plea Bargain,94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 299-300 (2004) (noting that the largest class of
downward departures consists of § 5K1.1 motions).
107.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 5K3.1.
108.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note
104, at 1 tbl.l.
109.
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
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the case was chosen to address seems unusual, if not unique, in the annals of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 1" 0 It is even more odd given that
reducing unwarranted disparity is the primary goal of the sentencing
Guidelines. As it stands, Rita's effect is likely to be similar to Koon in
another way: it will perpetuate marked differences among the circuits in
their rates of below-range sentences.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision to permit, but not require, a presumption of
reasonableness for a within-guideline sentence is likely to have little effect. But this is not to say there would have been no effect if the decision
had come out the other way. Indeed, the empirical question briefed in
Rita was in some respects beside the point. The important question was
not the effect of adopting the presumption in the circuits, but the effect of
the Supreme Court adopting or rejecting the presumption. The drug
would not have equal dosage regardless of the doctor, nor is its strength
necessarily equal whether it is given or taken away.
If the Court in Rita had rejected a presumption of reasonableness for
within-guideline sentences, it would have rejected the arguments the
government and the USSC had made in support of it. Chief among these
were that the Guidelines remain central in federal sentencing and that
they deserve substantial weight because they reflect the Sentencing Commission's considered judgment of the best way to achieve the statutory
purposes of sentencing found in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)."' Included in this
general argument are a number of specific empirical questions that are
ultimately of far greater consequence than the effects of a presumption of
reasonableness because they concern the foundations of the Guidelines
and their success at achieving the purposes of sentencing and the goals of
sentencing reform.
A. EmpiricalBases of GuidelineDevelopment andAmendment
One of these specific questions concerns the empirical basis for the
Guidelines. Justice Breyer was, of course, present at the creation as a
Sentencing Commissioner. In Rita he repeats his oft-told tale of the philosophical dilemmas that caused problems for the original Sentencing
Commission until it turned to an "empirical approach" to Guideline development. Based on a statistical analysis of 10,000 cases sentenced in
the years immediately preceding their work, the USSC set the initial
guideline ranges on the sentence that had been imposed for various categories of offenses and offenders."l 2 In this manner, they expected the
110. Posting of Peter Goldberger to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusbiog.com/movabletype/
archives/2007/06/anotherview_of.html (June 21, 2007, 08:48 PM).
111.
Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463.
112. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1988); see also Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh,
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Guidelines to largely reflect average past practice. Though the goals of
uniformity and proportionality often conflict, the Sentencing Commission developed a practical system that it believed sensibly reconciled the
two ends. Because of this history, Justice Breyer writes in Rita that
"[t]he Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sentencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the help
of many others in the law enforcement community." 113 He goes on to
explain that the "Commission's work is ongoing," and that "[t]he statutes
and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by
the sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process.""1 4 He describes how the amendment process will proceed through examination of
judges' stated reasons for departure, circuit court review of those reasons, and through "advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement
' 15
groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others." "
A lot has happened since Justice Breyer left the Sentencing Commission. Absent from his description of the Commission's work is any
discussion of the role played by mandatory minimum penalty statutes,
specific directives from Congress to the Sentencing Commission to increase penalties or set them at particular levels, or the many other ways
that Congress has shaped the present Guidelines. 1 6 This absence leaves
unanswered important questions about how judges are to treat guideline
ranges that do not reflect past practice or any of the laudatory guideline
The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 35-51 (2003) (discussing how the philosophy of the Guidelines was
shaped, and obscured, by the guideline development process).
113.
Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2464.
Id.
114.
Id. To support his account of the Guidelines' development and amendment process,
115.
Justice Breyer cites § lB 1.10(c) of the Guidelines manual, which lists 24 amendments that the USSC
has chosen to apply retroactively. Id. To date, the USSC has promulgated over 700 amendments, a
large proportion in response to acts of Congress. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING (AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM) (2004) app. B (B-1

to B-9), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/1 5_year_studyfull.pdf. Justice Breyer also cites
§ 1A 1.1, commentary, which contains an account of the empirical guideline development process
similar to that described by Justice Breyer in Rita. 127 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § IA1.1). It is worth noting, however, that as part of the
amendments made pursuant to the PROTECT Act, this comment was moved to a unique new section, "Historical Review of Original Introduction." This was done in part because the note no longer
reflected the realities of the present Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 11, § 1ALI..
116.
Justice Breyer is consistent in neglecting the influence of Congress. His seminal article
on the development of the Guidelines devotes several pages to the USSC's decision to increase
penalties for white collar offenses above average past practice. See Breyer, supra note 112. These
levels have long since been increased further, most recently by Congressional directives in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. But he mentions only in passing, and in a footnote, that the penalties for drug
trafficking offenses were set far above average past practice in order to incorporate the mandatory
minimum statutory penalties enacted by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See id. at 24
n. 121. The decision to incorporate the mandatory minimum penalties in the manner that it did had a
more profound effect on the federal prison population, and on the lives of many tens of thousands of
defendants, than any other decision of the original USSC. This impact was dramatically underat 24.
estimated by the USSC at the time the Guidelines were implemented. See id.
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amendment processes envisioned in the Sentencing Reform Act, but instead the will of Congress expressed through the medium of the sentencing Guidelines. Next term's case involving the Guideline for trafficking
in crack cocaine, Kimbrough v. United States,117 will give the Court an
opportunity to weigh in on this crucial question.
B. EmpiricalEvaluationof the Guidelines
The ultimate questions-part empirical, part policy-involve the relationship between the Guidelines, the statutory purposes of sentencing,
and the goals of sentencing reform. Much of the argument in Rita concerned if and how the USSC incorporated these purposes, and how well
the Guidelines are achieving them.
Sentencing reform was undertaken to a large degree to reduce unwarranted disparity. The Rita briefs summarize research to evaluate the
Guidelines' success at achieving this goal. But again, different parties
looked at the same evidence and reached different conclusions. Petitioner Rita cited the USSC's own research on the effects of presentencing stages on sentencing disparity, on regional disparity, and on
the adverse impact on black offenders of particular guideline provisions
such as that concerning crack cocaine. 1 8 He concluded that the Guidelines had "only partially achieved" the reduction of unwarranted disparity.1l9 The Department of Justice and the USSC, however, cited different
sections of the same report to argue that the Guidelines had reduced disparity from120the source at which they were primarily targeted-judicial
discretion.
At this point, the USSC's argument took a turn away from empiricism and toward a matter of definitions. "In focusing on disparities like
the crack/powder ratio, petitioners misapprehend the intended purpose of
§ 3553(a)(6)," 12' which is the statutory provision directing judges to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." Disparity that is mandated by Congress, the brief argued, cannot
by definition be unwarranted. Moreover, regional or other disparities
caused by prosecutorial decisions, such as charge bargaining, "cannot be
considered unwarranted disparity within the meaning of §

117.
127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007), cert. granted,60 U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 066330).
118.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *36-37 (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supranote 115, at 135, 141-43).
119.
Id. at 36.
120.
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING, supra note 115, at 94-99.
121.
Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at *27.
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3553(a)(6)"122 , even though the USSC has taken measures to reduce such
disparity (with limited success).
With these arguments, the debate has been removed from the realm
of empiricism and placed firmly on the ground of semantics. Even if the
objective facts about the Guidelines' effects on disparity are clear, no
consensus on the Guidelines' success can emerge until agreement is
reached on the meaning of "unwarranted." Nor can "disparity" be defined without consensus on the purposes of punishment and the priorities
among them. 123 Judging from the briefs in Rita, this consensus is as far
away as ever.
C. Empirical Questions About Individual Guidelines
Finally, the majority opinion in Rita may contain an invitation for
judges to entertain arguments and take evidence on a type of challenge to
the Guidelines that raises empirical questions at the heart of sentencing
practice. Defendants and prosecutors have argued, with some success,
that extraordinary circumstances can make the guideline range ineffective or disproportionate in a particular case, and that an outside-the-range
sentence is needed. 24 Rita seems to invite a more general challengethat a particular guideline is ineffective or disproportionate in a wide
range, or even the majority, of cases to which it linguistically applies. In
short, that the Guideline itself represents unsound policy.
To date, the courts of appeals have not looked favorably on these
"categorical challenges." But Justice Breyer may be asking them to look
again. He lists the kinds of arguments a judge might hear that the guideline sentence should not apply to a case:
[P]erhaps because (as the Guidelines themselves foresee) the case at
hand falls outside the "heartland" to which the Commission intends
individual Guidelines to apply .... perhaps because the Guidelines
sentence itselffails properly to reflect the § 3553(a) considerations,
or perhaps because the case warrants a different sentence regardless. 125
Later, the opinion describes the kinds of reasons sentencing judges need
to articulate for the sentences they impose: If it is clear that a judge rests
12 6
her decision upon the USSC's own reasoning, she need say very little.
But, if "a party contests the Guidelines sentence generally under
§ 3553(a)-that is, argues that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judg-

122.
Id.at 28 (emphasis in original).
Hofer, supra notes 12, 13, and 77.
123.
124.
See generally Regina Stone-Harris, How to Vary from the FederalSentencing Guidelines
Without Being Reversed, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 183 (2007).
125.
Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2461, 2465 (2007) (emphasis added).
126.
Id.at 2468.
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ment, or, for example, that they do not generally treat certain defendant
characteristics in the proper way," ,127 then more explanation is needed. ,228
Could it be that in Rita the Court is inviting the lower courts to hear
evidence that particular Guidelines are not working to achieve the statutory purposes? Only time, and perhaps the upcoming opinion in
Kimbrough, will tell. If it turns out the Court is now open to categorical
challenges of the type many commentators have long encouraged,129 Rita
may be just the beginning of empirical evidence on sentencing questions
presented to the Court.

127.
Id.
128.
All this makes more intriguing the opinion's description of the effects of a presumption of
reasonableness for the guideline sentence: "Nor does the presumption reflect strong judicial deference of the kind that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert agency
than to a district judge." Id. The facts being referred to in this passage do not sound like facts about
the case, but facts of the type also relevant to the USSC. In other words, empirical facts about the
effects of the Guidelines and its success or failure at achieving its purposes.
129.
For the earliest example of this "administrative law" approach to departures, see Ronald
F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats,andthe AdministrativeLaw Perspective on the FederalSentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 50-55 (1991); see also United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 365,
373 (D. Mass. 2005) (arguing for judges to compensate for the USSC's exclusion from the Administrative Procedures Act by developing a common law of sentencing that correlates particular guidelines with the statutory purposes); Joseph Luby, Reining in the "Junior Varsity Congress ": A Call
for Meaningful JudicialReview of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 1199, 123940, 1255-67 (1999). For an argument that a more radical change in sentencing guidelines is needed,
with a different type of judicial review, see Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chancefor Sentencing Reform: Establishinga Sentencing Agency in the JudicialBranch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 22429 (2005).

